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Abstract
Background: International donors support the partnership between the Government of Botswana and two
international organisations: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Africa Comprehensive
HIV/AIDS Partnership to implement Voluntary Medical Male Circumcision with the target of circumcising 80 %
of HIV negative men in 5 years. Botswana Government had started integration of the program into its health
system when international partners brought in the Models for Optimizing Volume and Efficiency to
strengthen delivery of the service and push the target. The objective of this paper is to use a systems model
to establish how the functioning of the partnership on Safe Male Circumcision in Botswana contributed to
the outcome.
Methods: Data were collected using observations, focus group discussions and interviews. Thirty participants
representing all three partners were observed in a 3-day meeting; followed by three rounds of in-depth interviews
with five selected leading officers over 2 years and three focus group discussions.
Results: Financial resources, “ownership” and the target influence the success or failure of partnerships. A combination
of inputs by partners brought progress towards achieving set program goals. Although there were tensions between
partners, they were working together in strategising to address some challenges of the partnership and implementation.
Pressure to meet the expectations of the international donors caused tension and challenges between the in-country
partners to the extent of Development Partners retreating and not pursuing the mission further.
Conclusion: Target achievement, the link between financial contribution and ownership expectations caused
antagonistic outcome. The paper contributes enlightenment that the functioning of the visible in-country partnership
is significantly influenced by the less visible global context such as the target setters and donors.
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Background
Partnerships for health
The Botswana Safe Male Circumcision (SMC) program is
a North-South partnership aiming to promote sexual
health via voluntary medical adult male circumcision [1, 2].
The Botswana SMC program was established to help meet
a particular public health target – the prevention of HIV
via the medical circumcision of 80 % of HIV negative men.
As important as HIV prevention is, the research reported
here is not about progress in meeting that target. Rather,
this is a study of how the Botswana SMC program
functions as a North-South partnership. Such research is
urgently needed, because many North-South health part-
nerships function poorly, and they fail to meet their goals
[3, 4]. By studying what factors promote and inhibit good
partnership functioning in existing projects like the
Botswana SMC program, the aim is to generate knowledge
that may help future North-South health partnerships
better meet their goals.
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Medical male circumcision is recommended by the
World Health Organization (WHO) for countries that
have high prevalence of HIV infections and low practice
of male circumcision [1, 2, 5]. Randomised control trials
provide evidence that the removal of the foreskin
reduces chances of men acquiring HIV through hetero-
sexual relationships by 50–60 % [6–8]. In 2014,
Botswana recorded an HIV prevalence rate of 25 % [9],
and Botswana is therefore one of the countries in which
male circumcision is a major public health goal.
Global health issues like HIV call for global solutions.
In modern public health practice for HIV prevention as
for other health priorities, countries are expected to con-
tribute the resources and expertise at their disposal. This
approach recognises that only by combining resources
can global society hope to achieve significant public
health improvements. But how should countries cooper-
ate in health development initiatives? A discredited
approach of the past is the North-South donor-recipient
model, with well-endowed Northern donor countries
paying the bills for development in the South, and there-
fore making the decisions [10–12]. Since the late 1980’s,
the preferred approach is the North-South partnership
model [12, 13]. Yet as reviewed below, effective North-
South partnerships are difficult to mount and maintain,
despite the best intentions of all parties.
A well-functioning partnership approach to develop-
ment has become so important that all of aid development
adopts the Paris Declaration’s partnership framework. The
Paris Declaration was signed in 2005 by the development
Ministers of well over 100 countries and the heads of key
international development organisations, agreeing inter-
national standards for ethical partnership on several di-
mensions: ownership, mutual accountability, managing for
results, alignment, and harmonization [14, 15]. Authentic
partnership implies a joint commitment to long term
interaction, shared responsibility for achievement, recipro-
cal obligation, equality, mutuality and balance of power
[16]. The idea is that partners with common interests and
diverse resources can create synergy if resources are
pooled to achieve partners’ common vision.
True partnership is difficult
Even if partnership is the preferred model of North-
South collaboration, it has long been observed that true
partnership is difficult to achieve and maintain when re-
sources are unevenly distributed [17]. Power is unevenly
distributed in most North-South partnerships [18], in-
cluding AIDS prevention partnerships [19–21]. Northern
and Southern partners may have very different ideas
about the meaning of partnership, as the term is value-
laden and has many possible meanings [22]. North-
South cooperation that is genuinely meant by the North
to be a partnership may be perceived by the South to
function in the donor-recipient mode [23]. Scepticism
about Northern motives is fed by findings that at least
some Northern actors use the idea of partnership in a
rhetorical or an instrumental way [24, 25]. Persistent
North-South asymmetry and perceived Northern dom-
ination has been reported in the literature right from
the beginning of the North-South health partnership
experiment [4, 11, 26]. A typical irritation is Northern
partners’ emphasis on Southern partners’ accountability,
experienced by Southern partners as a stripping away of
their managerial autonomy [12]. Manifestations of North-
South power imbalance can be quite direct; in his study of
a Dutch-Sri Lankan partnership, Fernando [27] cites a
statement made by an obviously frustrated Sri Lankan
NGO leader to the Dutch partners:
“As long as we agree, you say that the money belongs
to both of us. But the moment we disagree, you say
that the money belongs to you” ( [27], p.1).
Research on partnership processes: a public health priority
Given the difficulties of health partnerships generally,
and North-South partnerships in particular, research on
North-South partnership processes and functioning is a
public health priority. In a recent review of the effective-
ness of North-South partnerships, Kelly et al. [28] con-
clude that the quality and rigour of the evidence base is
thin. They emphasise that research is needed especially
at the level of individual partnerships and the bodies that
facilitate them. Kelly et al. [28] point to the need for
indicators and frameworks that address the benefits and
values of the partnership model of cooperation. They
also emphasise the need for research on pathways
(processes) that lead to effective partnerships. Others
have also called for more and better quality North-South
partnership research, and extend Kelly et al’s critique
and call for new research in several important ways.
Yassi et al. [29] call for a ‘communities of practice’ re-
search mentality whereby Northern partners seek multi-
directional learning – how can North partners improve
their own functioning? Murphy et al. [30] have described
practical tools to help North-South partnerships study
the ethics of collaboration, with a view to ensuring bene-
fits to all partners. Holmarsdottir and colleagues [31] call
for the practical use of conceptual frameworks of North-
South partnership to provide guidance about partnership
practices, and point to the need for a critical stance in
the conduct (and study) of North-South partnerships,
given the “paucity of empirical studies that have been
undertaken to both documents and deconstruct the
collaborative process…” ([31], p280-281). Corbin and
Mittelmark [3] describe a systems approach to the study
of partnership processes, and a systems analysis of a
North-South AIDS prevention partnership has addressed
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a number of the points of critique mentioned above
[32–34]. It is observed that the proposed mechanisms or
principles for accountability formulated for partnership
effectiveness in the Paris Declaration are experiencing
challenges and therefore need addressing [14]. Below
we discuss ownership; mutual accountability - that
poses expectations on financial contribution by the
South; managing for results – that is outcome fo-
cused [3, 4, 17, 24, 33, 35].
Mechanisms for accountability in partnerships
Ownership of programs by the recipient countries is
overemphasised by UN agencies as a way to work
against the observed imbalance of power between the
North and the South experienced over the past decades.
Ownership was added to the definition of partnerships
in the 2005 Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, and
since then the term has become a buzz word echoed
from all stakeholders [20]. International donors attempt
to put the concept of ownership into practice, for
example, though efforts to ensure that donor efforts are
aligned to fit the local administrative and strategic
systems [36]; promote domestic funding, and refine
conditions to measure the commitment of domestic
Governments to increase budgets towards HIV/AIDS
scale-up programs [21]. Such efforts to cultivate owner-
ship by the Global South follow events from the United
Nations General Assembly of 2011, where UNAIDS
appealed for shared responsibility in terms of increasing
long term domestic and international funding towards
health scale up programs, emphasizing that recipient
countries should be held accountable for rising domestic
investments on health [21, 37].
Mutual accountability and transparency in the use of
development resources is vital in aid partnerships ([14],
p4). The level of financial contribution is seen as an
indicator of the recipient country’s commitment to the
development programs [21]. Many African countries, in
spite of low levels of income, have attempted to increase
their share of AIDS expenditure to show commitment
and ownership [38]. Only Botswana and Namibia had
spending levels on HIV/AIDS sufficiently high to cover
their full program requirements in the year 2013 ([21]:
p.e56). Regardless of these local efforts, international
investment in HIV/AIDS interventions continues to
increase [37]. Seckinelgin [39] critiques the idea of
promoting funding as if it is the only way to succeed in
health interventions. He argues that putting significant
funding into ineffective intervention structures will not
yield effective results within a given space of time. For
example he critiques programs that do not encourage
behaviour change in those infected or affected by HIV
but emphasise only spending more money. His conten-
tion is that although increasing funding on HIV
prevention programs is crucial, it does not change
people’s behaviour automatically therefore the right
mechanisms of program implementation remain the
most important aspect for success [39]. Partnership pro-
motes other components of ownership like the political
environment, local strategies to implementation and cul-
tural relevance [10, 24]. McFalls assesses current part-
nerships in aid as not genuine, but as only deceptive
strategies to “legitimise” the domination of the powerful
under the pretence of benevolence [25].
Managing for results calls for measuring progress and
assessing results [15]. The Paris declaration is clear that
reporting outcome of results is vital to measure success
[15]. The global aid environment, and more generally,
health and development initiatives use targets and indi-
cators to map success. For example setting numerical
targets for programs was the norm and requirement for
implementation of MDGs. Even the global agenda post
MDGs still emphasis that target setting is critical for
tracking success [40]. The commission led by Waage
and colleagues to analyse MDG 1–7 note that “The use
of results based framework is regarded as one of the
strengths of the MDGs, and has certainly appealed in an
aid context with the desire of donors to see measurable
returns on investment” ([35], p1000). Fuduka- Parr and
colleagues [41] explain that targets are actually used to
monitor progress, to reward or punish recipient country
and policymakers. While UN agencies see the target ap-
proach as powerful, critics see progress in quantitative
achievements of some goals but observe numerous gaps
that hamper achievements. Targets and measures are
not easily conceptualised by local implementers and this
is largely associated with measurement, ownership and
leadership [35]. Several critics observe that the quantita-
tive, target oriented programs as well as measures used
side-line other important objectives like equity and
quality in reporting tools. This makes interventions
focus on ‘doing things right’ rather than ‘doing the right
things’ ([36], p153), and this can only be addressed
through inclusion of qualitative measures [35, 41, 42].
Given such challenges on the implementation of the
mechanisms for accountability the recommendation by
Corbin and colleagues to study partnership functioning
and processes needs to be considered [3].
There is little research that examines the functioning
of these partnerships and their authenticity [11, 33].
There are a few studies that analyse the functioning of
partnerships including Weiss et al., Jones and Barry, and
Corbin et al. [3, 33, 43, 44]. In analysing partnership
between the North and one organisation in the South,
Corbin et al. [33] observed that there was sharing of
power between the partners; Jones et al. [43] emphasise
the importance of trust and good leadership as key to
success in partnership functioning; Weiss et al. [44]
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established that leadership effectiveness was a key ingredi-
ent to partnership synergy while administration and man-
agement did not really show any significant contribution
to positive functioning. Power imbalance is the common
finding in most literature on partnerships in general, espe-
cially between North and South [11]. Mawdsley et al. [18]
argue that partnerships in international health initiatives
frequently involve, on the one hand, blurry ownership of
health programs by the Global South and, on the other
hand, pressure from donors to ensure their conditions, ex-
pectations and targets are met. More positively, partner-
ships have been documented that stimulate the Southern
partners to develop and increase their competence in
population and reproductive health [45]. In their analysis
of partnerships Bailey and Dolan [46] find the good and
the bad. While Southern partners benefit from skills
brought in by the North, gain capital benefits like infra-
structure development, and develop a greater voice in the
process, capacity building is still seen as a one way flow
from the north [46].
The case
The case in this study is the Botswana Safe Male Cir-
cumcision program. In adapting VMMC, Botswana calls
it Safe Male Circumcision (SMC) program. This research
attempts to answer the call above (for analysing partner-
ship functioning) by exploring the functioning of the
partnership between the government of Botswana’s
Ministry of Health (MH) and two international organisa-
tions: U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC); and Africa Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partner-
ship (ACHAP) to implement Voluntary Medical Male
Circumcision VMMC [1]. The WHO recommended to
VMMC implementing countries that 80 % of HIV
negative men be circumcised by 2016 in order to make a
significant impact on the countries’ current infection
rates [47]. The two international organisations have
worked with Botswana Government in many HIV
intervention programs for a long time now, hence the
Government calls them Development Partners (DPs)
[48]. Their long term partnership with Botswana is set
out in Botswana’s National Strategic Framework for HIV
and AIDS 2010–2016 (NSF) [48], a locally developed
document that provides strategic direction on the
national response to HIV/AIDS [48]. Behind these
Development Partners are the unseen international
donors: PEPFAR which funds CDC and Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation for ACHAP. Different authors in
partnership list different dimensions of partnership func-
tioning including partnership culture, administrative and
management roles, leadership, professional expertise, finan-
cial resources and nonfinancial resources, challenges with
partner involvement and challenges that are community
related [33, 43, 44]. We captured different partner roles and
resource contribution in the partnership for SMC in
Botswana. See Table 1.
This paper contributes to the scanty literature on the
functioning of partnerships between the North and the
South. The aim of the paper is to use the Bergen Model
of Collaborative Functioning (BMCF) to explore achieve-
ments and challenges of the partnership on a Safe Male
Circumcision (SMC) program in Botswana, while
making efforts to attain the set target. Specifically we
establish how the mission and functioning of the part-
nership contributed to the actual outcome.
Conceptual framework
The Bergen Model of Collaborative Functioning (BMCF)
We use a systems model, the Bergen Model of
Collaborative Functioning (BMCF) [3] as a framework
Table 1 Partner roles and resource contribution




PEPFAR Bill and Melinda
gates foundation
Financial contribution/In country donor ✓ ✓ ✓
Development Partner (in the country) ✓ ✓
Coordinator and owner of program ✓
International donor ✓ ✓
Provides scientific expertise and skills ✓
Provides training of staff on surgery ✓ ✓ ✓
Provides training of staff on demand creation ✓ ✓
Provider of implementation staff for surgery ✓ ✓ ✓
Provider of general medical equipment ✓
Provides MC surgery kits ✓
Marketing and advertisement of MOVE (large scale) ✓
Provider of staff for mobilisation (Demand Creation) ✓ ✓
Provider of infrastructure nationally ✓
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to examine the operationalisation of the SMC partnership
in Botswana. The BMCF is shown in Fig. 1. We choose to
use this model because it has been used before in
assessing an HIV/AIDS partnership in the global South,
[3, 32–34] and also that it addresses functioning. The
BMCF model is useful in illustrating the contextual
process within the partnership [34]. Inputs include the
partnership’s mission (selected approach to deal with a
problem), partner resources (knowledge, skills, compe-
tence, etc.) and financial resources (funding and material
inputs) [33]. The collaborative context (or throughput
section) of the partnership is analysed through the
interaction – positive or negative – of four aspects that
impact the maintenance (administrative) tasks and pro-
duction tasks (related to partnership’s mission), namely,
leadership, communication, roles & structure and the
inputs themselves [33].
The output of the partnership can be additive results
(unaffected by collaboration of the partners); or synergy,
where more is produced by collaborating than if the
partners had not interacted with one another; or antag-
onistic results, where the costs of partnership exceed the
benefits [3, 33]. Additive results are things that could
still be achieved without the partnership. This is based
on the argument that a partnership is always built to
tackle an existing problem where some action has been
taken, anyway. Synergy is what is achieved because of
the “multiplicative interaction” of the partnership. Put in
mathematical terms it is 2 + 2 = 5 [33]. Determinants of
synergy include partner relationship ingredients like
trust and power, partnership assets, partnership charac-
teristics, and leadership ([43]: p. 409). If synergy is
achieved this may have a positive feedback impact on
partnership inputs and functioning [33]. Reflecting on
antagonistic results may also result in positive feedback
[33]. Corbin and Mittelmark [3] note that it is possible for
a partnership to include both synergistic and antagonistic
elements concurrently. Corbin and Mittelmark’s theoret-
ical contribution to the BMCF is the enlightenment on
how context, specifically cultural and societal context, as
well as partnership processes and partner contributions
interact both positively and negatively to influence
partnership functioning [34]. In assessing the volunteers’
participation in the organisation, they identified that
positive results are generated by: the experience of social
connectedness; seeing volunteering as opportunity for
public recognition and for expressing passion to help
others [34].
The Bergen model of collaborative functioning: Fig. 1 should
fit here
Corbin and Mittelmark [3] record that nearly 50 % of
partnerships dissolve early and impulsively. They ob-
serve that resources, characteristics of partners, features
of the partnership strategy and environmental factors
can either support synergy or create antagony between
partners ([3]: p.365). Fowler [4] adds other elements that
may cause antagonistic outcomes in partnerships such
as: paternalistic behaviour of those with cash power;
upholding the approach of the Northern rather than the
Fig. 1 The Bergen Model of Collaborative Functioning: Adapted from Corbin JH, Mittelmark MB, Lie GT. Grassroots volunteers in context: rewarding
and adverse experiences of local women working on HIV and AIDS in Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. Global health promotion. 2015:1757975915569514
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Southern partners; hiring staff from the North because
of capacity limitations of workers from the South, and
the North’s anxiety about loss of control. Corbin and
Mittelmark [3] argue that although more financial re-
sources can improve the functioning of the relationship,
funding can also complicate functioning: antagony is
created if partners and funders view the partnership as a
waste of financial resources and time. A study in
Indonesia found imbalance in the governance of the
partnership, adapting a top down approach, where prior-
ity areas were defined by the multilateral agencies only
and were a reflection of their own concern in the
governance field, not those of the local people [24].
Methods
Given the dynamism of partnerships and our intention
to explore views of administrative and implementing
officers at different levels we chose qualitative methods
to achieve a broad and diverse understanding of the work-
ing of partnerships in the SMC program in Botswana.
Research sites
There were three research sites based on the location of
the different partners at national and district level.
National Leading officers for the major partners, MH
and DPs were in Gaborone, the capital city. Local imple-
menting/administrative officers, District Health Manage-
ment Teams DHMTs were in the other two sites,
Mochudi and Hukuntsi villages. These villages were
purposefully selected as two villages with contrasting
population and geographic sites: the former being highly
populated and close to the city where services are easily
accessed; and the latter being sparsely populated and in
one of the remote areas of the country.
Participants and recruitment
Groups of participants from national to districts level
took part in the study. Although participants at national
and district level were not promised anonymity of their
organisations, for confidentiality reasons we refer to MH
partners as DP1 and DP2. Participants comprised lead-
ing officers working for the three partner organizations,
MH and its DHMTs, DP1 and DP2. The SMC lead offi-
cer in MH introduced the first author to all the partners
through a 3 day annual planning and strategy meeting
that she was invited to attend in 2012. Observation in
the meeting created a platform for the first author to
establish rapport, enabling direct contact with leading
officers from partner organisations to set interview
times. DHMT representatives that attended the 3-day
meeting were not gatekeepers at district level; therefore
the higher officers at the DHMTs were approached
directly using permission from MH. In that way access
to the district health officers was granted. The first
author had personal links to both communities, which
made it easy to access the participants.
Data collection
The first author spent approximately 18 months in
Botswana between December 2012 and August 2015
collecting data and observing the different phases of the
SMC partnership. The research question set out to
explore the functioning and contextual interaction of the
SMC partnership in Botswana. The research used three
qualitative research methods: observation, one-on-one
interviews and focus group discussions (FDG). Non-
participant observation was used during the partners’
2012 planning meeting since the researcher was not
allowed to comment but just listen and take notes.
Follow-ups were only allowed outside the meeting room
where the researcher could have informal conversations
with the participants. The 2012 planning meeting
informed the research on the fundamental themes to
explore within the parameters of the research questions.
Data from the meeting influenced the direction of the
data collection for the rest of the research project: who
to ask what, and where, and also guided the drawing of
the interview and FGD guide, as well as the observations
guide (adjustments made on the ground). This included
topic guides and questions on: the mission of the part-
nership; leadership of the partnership, partners’ resource
contribution; partners’ roles; general functioning of the
partnership and of SMC implementation.
Data were collected through a 3 year period and
with great attempt to do it in a cyclic manner (with
follow-ups of the same key informants where pos-
sible); and following important incidences in the part-
nership processes. We used an observation guide at
the 2012 partners’ planning meeting where 30 partici-
pants from all three organisations gathered, interview
guides for rounds of interviews with key national offi-
cers leading the program within each organisation
(three lead officers at MH and one from each of the
DPs). A total of eight interviews were conducted with
the national officers, including three follow-up inter-
views with one lead MH officer over the years. Three
FGDs comprising five to nine participants were
carried out with the Mochudi and Hukuntsi DHMT
teams respectively, as well as the Mochudi MOVE
team. For interviews and FGDs we developed a semi-
structured topic guide. We asked questions like; What
is the mission of the partnership? What roles do
different partners play? What resources do partners
contribute?
The range of data collection methods employed
generated diverse data and was also a good source of
triangulation, linking what is discussed at national
level with what took place at district level and on the
Katisi et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:42 Page 6 of 19
ground. All data were collected from December
2012–2015. Data for all three parts of the BMFC the-
oretical framework, inputs, throughputs and output
were covered throughout the period of data collection
in a progressive way. For example there were new re-
sources contributed or withdrawn at different times,
repetitive activities run throughout the years, negative
and positive outputs realised at different phases of
the partnership.
Data analysis
The observation session for the 3-days-review and
planning meeting was recorded as detailed written
notes following the preference of the participants. All
other interviews and focus group discussions were
audio recorded with permission from the participants.
Three research assistants transcribed the data. In
order to ensure accuracy and validate what was tran-
scribed the first author translated all transcribed data
from Setswana to English and cross checked those
already transcribed in English to verify transcripts
against audio recordings. NVivo ten qualitative data
management computer software was used to manage
and analyse data, hence all data were imported into
the software for coding using Attride-Stirling’s
Thematic Network Analysis [49]. The data analysing
team comprised two PhD students as well as the first
and second author. The various data sources were
analysed connecting different groups of participants.
Following Attride-Stirling’s [49] stages of data ana-
lysis, data were initially read to code topics raised by
the participants. Then basic themes were abstracted
from the coded sections and grouped into organizing
themes, which were then further clustered to global
themes. In view of these themes, we reflected on our
data to get an understanding of the working of the
partnership in question, relating our findings to our
research question. In order to strengthen the objectiv-
ity of the analysis, the team discussed organizing and
global themes to reach a consensus throughout the
analysis, ensuring stability and relevance.
Results
The findings are presented according to the BMCF as
our theoretical framework. Four elements of the
model being: 1. Input, 2. Throughput and 3. Output
and 4. Feedback to mission, form our global themes.
Basic and organising themes that emerged from the
analysis are presented in Table 2.
Input
The partners’ mission
The Government of Botswana has an established
national strategy and a framework of operation for all
health initiatives, called the National Strategic Frame-
work (NSF) that is reviewed every 4 years. The NSF
comprises all ministries, with MH being the lead minis-
try; long term development partners like DP1 and DP2;
civil society organisations and NGOs; and the private
sector. The same development partners were partners in
the SMC program. Several officers explained this. An
example follows:
We, the DPs are always in the country. We are here
to help with all HIV/AIDS intervention strategies.
(Lead officer 5 in Gaborone, during the second
round interview).
All partners were clear about their mission: to get
HIV negative men of ages 13–49 circumcised in order
to reduce HIV infection rate in the country. They
were also all working towards a target of circumcising
80 % of HIV negative men by the year 2016, which is
100 000 men in a year. They divided the target
between them. The partners were also clear about
their commitment to the mission. One DP1 partici-
pant explained their commitment towards achieving
the mission:
So we have at best 40 % of the 100 thousand target
that is to be covered. At best 40 % of the target is
our aim as DP1.
One DP2 officer at the 3-day meeting added:
We aim for 25 % of the target…
Although the MH did not state a percentage they were
aiming for within the 80 % target, they explained that their
aim was to integrate SMC in the health system
nationwide, establishing it as a long term program, not
just up to year 2016. The 80 % target by 2016 was defined
as a project within the Government’s long term program.
Approaches to the mission
There were two approaches used in implementing SMC
in Botswana: The integration of SMC in the whole
health system that was locally planned and designed;
and the MOVE approach that was externally introduced
through DP1, and adopted in 2012 in parallel to integra-
tion. At the beginning of SMC implementation between
2007 and 2009 all partners worked together to develop
and implement integrating SMC in the whole health
system. Lead officer 3 explained:
Government’s long term plan is to integrate SMC into
the normal health system. We worked on this with our
partners from the beginning.
Katisi et al. Globalization and Health  (2016) 12:42 Page 7 of 19
Table 2 Themes emerging form data analysis: Applying the Bergen Model of Collaborative Functioning
Basic themes Organising themes Global themes
1. Botswana government HIV National Strategic Framework (NSF) lead by NACA
2. All ministries, development partners CBOs, NGOs and private sector are part of the NSF
3. MH, DP1,DP2 are three main partners in the SMC program
4. DHMT works at district level
5. All partners involved throughout the planning process since 2007
6. All partners target HIV negative men aged 15–49 years to circumcise through SMC
7. All partners aim to have circumcised 80 % of HIV negative men by year 2016
Clear Partner Mission Input
8. Botswana government integrated circumcision within health services nationwide since 2007
9. DPs introduced MOVE project in 2011 to help government push set target in selected areas
Approaches to the mission
10. DP1 viewed as a major financial contributor: more monetary funds; sub-constructs companies;
built 2 permanent clinics; provides surgery kit; provides mobile clinics and transport
11. DP1 contributes funds and funds medical personnel and transport
12. MH contributes funds; provides health structures nationally; provides medical equipment and transport
Financial Resource
Contribution
13. DPs deployed medical staff to Government health centers to do SMC
14. DPs deployed staff moved to form dedicated MOVE teams
15. DP1 brings in special scientific expertise
16. MH’s avails its medical staff nationally to participate in SMC
Partner Resource
Contribution
17. MH as owner, coordinator, chair, provider of space and financing
18. DP1 as technical advisor, expert, advertising, mobilisation, provider of clinics structures and main donor
19. DP2 as donor, implementer and community mobiliser
Clear Partner Roles Throughput
20. Partners developed short term and long term communication strategies; training manuals and reporting
system together
Communication
21. Development partners use different reporting systems than MH’s
22. Development partners do not report to MH systematically
23. Reporting between partners was not transparent
24. Development partners reported directly to their international donors
25. The Government reported all donor funds usage to OECD
26. Way of accountability give blurry structure
Financial resources
27. More finances spent but less numbers of circumcised men causes conflict
28. MH’s financial contribution queried to be not transparent
29. Ownership seems linked to finance contribution
30. MH’s ownership of the program is questioned
31. MH sees structures as big contribution
Input Interaction
In-kind resources
32. Donors keep sending more equipment for circumcision
33. Lots of equipment is wasted
34. There is inconsistency on balance sheet for number of circumcision instruments, wasted and remaining
35. MH is blamed for not taking care of such equipment
Partner resources
36. MH viewed as a weak coordinator at times
37. MH ownership is queried
38. Government health centers is blamed to be participating little in circumcision
39. MH feels MOVE strategy naturally creates dependency on government health staff
40. Districts prioritised attending to ill patients than circumcision
41. DHMTs blamed for not prioritising SMC
42. Health centers viewed SMC as the DPs’ program
43. Partners consulted with the national traditional leadership at planning stage
44. MH is seen as a leader and owner
45. There is not enough support from the highest national leadership to influence men for circumcision
46. MH’s placements of coordination leadership is queried
47. DHMTs are said to not take leadership role accordingly
Leadership
48. DPs blame MH for setting the target high
49. DPs blame MH for not putting enough effort and resources to push the set target
50. MH is frustrated about the mathematical model used by WHO to set country target
49. Unattainable target is seen as the highest risk in program implementation
51. MH and DPs express frustration that the 80 % target is not attained regardless of their massive efforts
51. DPs report pressure from donors on reconciling dollar to numbers
Mission threatened Feedback
mission
52. DPs indicate that the donors will cut down on the funds
53. International donors reduce funding support to Botswana
54. DP2 pulls away its employed doctors gradually from 2013 and leaves a gap in implementation
55. DP1 pulls away its financial and technical assistance abruptly in 2014 and leaves a gap in
implementation
Antagony Output
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Lead officer 1 in round 2 interview explained the
integration target per health facility:
We expect clinics to circumcise one client per day or 5
clients per kilometre through our integration strategy.
The integration strategy did not circumcise enough
men to approach the target yet MH had an obligation to
meet target by 2016. The new MOVE project was intro-
duced by DP1 in 2011 to help push target. All partners
embraced it and MH viewed it as great help. Lead officer
3 explained:
…..but then this idea of the MOVE project came in in
2011….It was introduced by PEPFAR through DP1.
Through move MC is marketed and advertised to get
many numbers of men to circumcise at the same time.
Lead Officer 1 also expressed appreciation of MOVE:
The Government is not enough alone. We are weak
alone…you see? We welcome the development partners
to fill in the gaps…, you see… With targets set,
Government needs assistance…. We appreciate the
MOVE project because there is a lot of good in it; to
help us reach the numbers.
However, MOVE was not covering the whole country
so issues of equity were of concern to the MH: In giving
the official opening speech at the 3-day meeting, an
invited high official commented on the need for demand
creation of the program nationwide. He said:
Government emphasises equity. We need to strive for
equity, not just a few districts for the MOVE project
but all districts. Circumcision, circumcision,
circumcision is our breath.
Resources
Resources include financial, capital and staff resources.
MH appreciated partner resource contribution in both
the integration and MOVE implementation strategies.
Lead officer 1 explained:
Because of challenges of resources we thought the idea
of combining resources with DPs was a good one.
Financial resources
The DPs contributed financial resources towards achiev-
ing the mission. The MH also contributed its national
funds and mobilised other international funding support
besides DP1 and DP2 partner contributions. Although it
was not possible for the first author to access partners’
contract agreements, it was communicated clearly that for
MOVE implementation, the DPs contributed massive
monetary resources to help push target. DP1 was said to
be the main financial contributor. The impact of resource
contribution by development partners was experienced
even at implementation level. One DHMT officer stated
this in an FGD:
Many people turn up for circumcision when the
MOVE teams from the DP1 contractors come. They
come with lots of resources you see…last time they
were here they brought vehicles which were used to
fetch people from settlements around to come here in
the hospital for circumcision. They also have lots of
staff. We don’t, we are overwhelmed with many other
duties. Not just circumcision.
Partner resources (skills)
Partner resources include skills and other in-kind re-
sources other than money. The MH availed all its heath
facilities and medical equipment in the whole country to
do circumcision. The health facilities and some of the
medical equipment were used by the MOVE dedicated
teams as well. DP1 provided mobile clinics and con-
structed two main permanent clinics in the capital city;
and brought in 80 Peacecorp Volunteers specifically to
push the SMC target. At the time of the data collection
in 2012 they were promising ‘clinics in the box,’ fully
equipped mobile trucks. DP2 also gave funding,
provided about 30 foreign medical doctors and a num-
ber of nurses to do the surgery, and paid community
mobilisers to recruit men for circumcision. Lead officer
4 explained further on DP1 contribution:
So what we bring to the table as DP1 is a level of
scientific knowledge that many organisations don’t
have….Prepex study… but we also bring in experience
from other countries on how partnerships work and
how coordination can occur and how systems can be
built…monitoring and implementing change…that
kind of a thing.
The DPs supported the integration program by
deploying staff to government health centers around the
country. One of the MH officers explained:
When we started the integration program, the DPs
deployed their staff (seconded doctors and nurses) to
government health centers to work with our nurses
and doctors in circumcision.
When MOVE implementation started more doctors
were employed by the DPs to form dedicated teams for
both static and mobile clinics. Lead officer 1 explained
this:
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When they promised dedicated MOVE teams and we
know that in Botswana we have skeletal staff…..just
the few of us, why would we refuse?
Additionally, DP1 outsourced contractors, some to do
training, one to do marketing and demand creation and
others to carry out the surgery. This appeared to be the
main difference between integration and MOVE. One
MH officer explained:
When the MOVE idea came in it overpowered the
original one. In MOVE, DPs brought in demand
creation strategies like adverts on TV and radio,
public campaigns, mobile clinics for circumcision and
staff to do the job.. So we cover many people at a time.
Integration is a long term program and is not as fast
as MOVE.
Lead officer 5 explained further on their contribution
to bring speed to the project:
We serve as catalysts to government..basically making
it do things faster because we are always focusing on
cost effectiveness. We have brought in 30 medical
doctors to help move target.
Lead officer 5 added:
We provided 30 doctors to train other staff and to do
surgery in dedicated clinics.
The government staff that was already employed
continued to participate in SMC through the integrated
program with the health system.
Throughput
The context for partnership operation comprises main-
tenance/administrative tasks which in this case included
development of communication strategies, training and
reporting systems; and production task which are imple-
mentation activities like periodic funds injection, equip-
ment purchases, demand creation activities and the
surgery (circumcision). As the inputs interact during
production and maintenance activities through time,
roles and power struggles are manifested. This is shaped
by the interaction of roles, input, leadership and
communication. There can be both positive and negative
experiences as the partners interact to work together.
We therefore present such interaction, some of which
overlap.
Clear partner roles (roles/structure)
All officers interviewed defined the partners’ roles the
same way: MH as owner, coordinator, provider of
structures and equipment, staff for the integration
program and financing; DP1 as an in-country donor,
technical advisor, expertise provider, advertising, mo-
bilisation, provider of clinics structures; DP2 as an in
country donor, organisation and provider of imple-
menting staff for the MOVE program. Although there
was manifestation of power struggle during maintenance
and production activities, the roles did not change,
for example government still maintained its role as
the custodian and owner of the program. See Table 1
for roles.
Communication
Strategic documents were developed together at national
level. All partner representatives explained that they had
worked together as partners from the inception of the
program in terms of strategizing on the implementation
approach and developing strategic documents: communi-
cation strategies, monitoring and evaluation plan 2010–
2016 and the reporting systems. Lead officer 1explained
this:
Year 2007–2008 was a planning period. As the other
presenter stated all operational documents were
developed then. We formulated these together….The
integration of SMC in all health centres started in 2009.
Lead officer 1 made the hierarchy of the partnership
clear:
We, MH, started the SMC project as “parental states”1
but with the partners participating. We started with
trainings, formulation of strategies and so on.
Development Partners have always taken part in SMC
from the beginning with government leading.
Another of the DP2 participating officers clarified that
the documents were developed in consultation with the
traditional leadership at national level. He said:
Remember we got guidance from the House of
Chiefs on what circumcision is called in Setswana
[Botswana national language]. We tried to engage
those who could help in proper language.
The government clinicians on the ground were also
involved early in the program. They took part in
developing the SMC curriculum. One officer representing
DP1 explained as he argued that doctors need to be
involved more:
So you see…, when we were developing the curriculum
that time we were getting a lot of input from the
clinicians as to how we can improve it.
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Whereas at planning stage the partners agreed on the
same reporting systems and communication strategies,
there seemed to be divisions and differences at imple-
mentation level. There were queries that the DPs were
using their own separate manuals for implementation
and own reporting system different from the initial ones
formulated. One officer queried this during the 3-day
meeting:
We need to fast track the issue of the different training
manuals so that we have a document that is
standardized. The manuals between MH and DPs
have differences here and there…. we need something
standardised.
MH further explained that the DPs were not reporting
consistently to them as the coordinating organisation in




The partners discussed and worked on strategies for
working together. Staff resources were a challenge to
government, therefore they appreciated that partners
could provide staff to support the integration program.
Lead officer 1 said:
Our districts had a challenge to take circumcision in
at a massive scale. So it was good for us that the DPs
seconded their staff to the health centers.
However, the deployed DP staff queried that they were
assigned other duties in government health centers and
this interfered with strengthening the SMC program. It
seems the MOVE project helped address these queries
and maximised focus on the mission.
Lead officer 5 explained how they solved the problem:
Forming dedicated teams was the best arrangement
for the MOVE project so that we can focus and push
target.
Even though the MOVE teams were separated to
work alone, resources continued to be shared to
support the mission. Government supported MOVE
teams with vehicles and other medical equipment.
However, during FGDs all DHMT staff expressed that
there is continuous tension between MOVE staff and
government health management staff on provision of
resources. One said:
You know the MOVE team sometimes needs vehicles
for mobilisation of other activities. But we cannot
always provide them with vehicles. Most of the time
our transport is committed to other health duties,
transporting sick patients…and then we are seen as
not supportive of SMC.
DPs also complained about lack of commitment by
DHMT staff, which they called “dependency.” The
“dependency” seemed to be caused by the fact that
the health personnel in the clinics did not regard
SMC as a “priority” program compared to ailing pa-
tients. Several officers have reiterated this throughout
the years, both at national and DHMT levels. One
said:
SMC is not a priority within Government clinics.
When there is a diarrhoea outbreak or a bleeding
patient or something, that is what is given attention.
SMC clients are made to wait or return.
Another said:
If you go to the district these days the districts are not
seeing SMC as anything.
Following up this issue at district level with the
DHMTs, many expressed the same thing in both group
discussions and FGDs. An example follows:
You see, it is not that we are not taking SMC serious.
This is a prevention program. But sick patients are a
priority to us. Also, we are understaffed in clinics and
so we have to prioritise…but we try.
A DP1 officer added:
There is evidence that when DHMT coordination is
leading and participating, things move, but when it is
not there, little moves. We need a way to make DHMT
own the program.
DPs also questioned the placement of regional
coordinators within MH, suggesting that the north
coordinator’s office should move to the north. How-
ever MH argued that this would not work efficiently
for national coordination. One MH officer responded
to this:
This is not the first time I hear of this suggestion.
You wouldn’t be happy if I do that to your office.
There was no query on the DPs’ staff performance.
However, some DPs staff roles were not clear to MH.
When one of the leading officers in MH was asked
about Peace-Corp volunteers he answered:
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About Peace-Corp I do not know what they are doing.
I really don’t know if they can make any impact when
Batswana youth are failing.
A year following these interviews, the Peace-Corp
volunteers had stopped working for SMC. Although
none of the officers at national or district level made any
comment about the MOVE team doctors, they were all
foreign employees.
Financial and technical resources
MH appreciated the massive financial resource contribu-
tion by DPs regardless of reported delays to fulfil promised
funds on time. However the high level of funding gave the
partner a wedge to question issues of ownership, defining
a blurred relationship between partners. DPs queried that
they contributed more money to SMC than government
and that they were transparent about what they gave but
MH was not. Lead officer 5 queried lack of transparency
from MH:
The Government is supposed to govern..,. You see now
we say DP1 brings so much money to the program,
DP2 has so much money… The Government keeps
quite, that’s why we are asking can the Government
tell us what its budget is… This is one question I have
never gotten an answer for.
The conversation below between two officers at the
3-day meeting shows more questioning on government’s
level of contribution of financial resources.
Lead officer 1:
So, in terms of funding circumcision, the Government
of Botswana has money. The Government creates its
funding pot from all over, I cannot exhaust the list.
For example 19 million pula is projected to come from
(an international organisation mentioned).
Lead officer 4:
How does Government make its plan then? Is it donors
first, then Government.
Lead officer 1:
You are supporting me. Don’t ask me what I have,
bring what you have….The Government provides all
clinic structures, we provide staff, and we provide
equipment.
MH further explained that besides external support
government gives out funds from its own internal
budget. MH also asked the meeting participants to be
aware that government has offered infrastructure, equip-
ment and its medical staff for implementation of SMC.
Contrary to resources as key to SMC implementation,
several officers from DHMTs reported that even where
MOVE brought lots of resources, men still showed
resistance. This was explained more even in later
interviews (round 2 and 3) and also witnessed at the
MOVE campaigns. One DHMT officer said:
I do not think the main issue should be resources only
as you see it. You know even during large MOVE
campaigns here in Francistown [second largest city]
where we have all resources in place men come to
listen in quite large numbers we still have a few
turning up to circumcise.
Whereas DPs felt they were using more resources yet
getting poor results and whereas there were few numbers
of men circumcising than expected, external donors still
spent more money on supplying circumcision equipment
(kits). In her presentation, one officer from MH reported
that there was wastage of equipment in the clinics because
the numbers turning up for circumcision does not match
the massive number of equipment purchased. She
reported:
…78 000 kits were bought and given out; 33 000 kits
were used therefore 45 000 remain. But only 25 000
were accounted for… This means 20 000 kits are
missing or wasted. Hundreds of kits are sent to
districts yet only a few SMCs are done in a month.
We overestimated numbers.
Lead officer 4 responded to this presentation with
concern:
This exact issue is the same thing we are going to be
nailed about as we account to the ambassador and to
Washington DC.
Blurred roles and structure
Whereas MH was not managing partners’ funds and
transparency between partners on utilisation of such
funds was limited, the MH still had to account for all
funds as received country funds to the program. In this
way, accountability seemed to be in one direction. MH
officer 1 explained the dilemma that the Government
faces when reporting OECD, having to act as a parent
who protects the partnership:
When the high office in MH reports to OECD he
reports all funding as the Botswana basket. He cannot
tell them that most of the donor funds are spent on
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overheads, paying contracted companies and
administration, not on the client, even though this
may be true. He has to speak like a parent, in a way
that would bring more support in the future.
The Government has to account for funds without
knowing the details of the DPs budgets.
It is not easy to ask “how much are you paying your
Coordinator?” It is an internal thing. That is how it is
and that is the life we have to live…We have to
account and have to ensure that we are not blamed.
Leadership
In the 3-day meeting, there was a reflection that the
partners appreciated the administrative leadership of the
program (officers leading). However, there were queries
especially on MH as the owner, host and leader of the
program. This is presented under resources above.
Ownership is also understood in terms of commitment.
During the meeting and the round of interviews, devel-
opment partners expressed that the levels of commit-
ment to the program differ within the MH’s different
levels; with high commitment at national level but little
commitment at district level. Meanwhile the MH viewed
these as teething problems of a new program: Lead
officer 2 explained:
..with a new program you will always experience a
challenge in the first 2 years of implementation.
Another officer saw it as a common problem on
vertical programs. During interview 2 in Gaborone, Lead
officer 3 said:
All health programs start as vertical programs and
have challenges, but the aim is to see to it that these
programs are integrated within the existing system.
In addition, country leadership is considered important
in international partnerships. There were comments of
appreciation for the support from some of the Botswana
political leaders in high positions. One Member of Parlia-
ment was regarded as a champion because he circumcised
under SMC and was campaigning for the program in his
constituency. Some politicians at community level were
also cited as supporting the program. However, commit-
ment of the country leadership was questioned by all three
partners. There was a conversation on this issue among all
the three partners. One said:
But in my opinion have you ever seen the high
leadership of this country coming out and saying
“citizens of Botswana lets circumcise.”
The house laughed at this comment. Lead officer 3
responded:
Do not mention higher leadership when talking about
this program.
The same officer shared that the higher office at MH
is working on getting the influence of the national lead-
ership. Another officer his experience with Members of
Parliament:
The committee we met at parliament said “Our hands
are full, consult with the community. Whatever the
chiefs say is what the communities do…”
It seemed that consultation with the high political
leadership was done superficially. One officer shared
feedback from the House of Chiefs:
We also talked to the House of Chiefs and they
complained that they are not being involved in the
program. They said they needed adequate information
to articulate issues that are to be addressed.
Although there was contention on resources and the tar-
get partners made an effort to find solutions to the prob-
lems. For example, during the 3-day meeting they divided
into several groups to discuss how to address the challenge
of high ‘unachievable’ target; different demand creation
strategies to recruit more men; how to strengthen DHMTs
to be more involved in SMC. Financial tensions were not
addressed in the groups. However, the cyclic interviews
following the meeting (in 2013 to 2014) not reveal much
implementation of the brainstormed ideas.
Feedback on the mission
Feedback on the mission was experienced at different
phases of the partnership. As partners met annually they
reviewed the mission and strategized on improving their
approaches to implementation. However, pressure from
donors resulted in the DPs retreating. During the 3-day
strategic meeting, the participants assessed risks to the
program goal achievement. The 80 % set target was the
first thing to be listed as a risk. There were debates
around this target with questions as to why MH
accepted it while it was not realistic to Botswana setting.
It was explained that WHO used mathematical models
to calculate the target for Botswana. A sample conversa-
tion on the target follows:
Officer 1: There was pressure of 100 000 not being
negotiable or debatable… If these directives are not
realistic they have to correct themselves on the way.
You cannot achieve by just demanding the plan.
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Officer 2: Yaah we were being forced to achieve some-
thing that is not achievable.
Officer 1: …there is an option that we could increase
the number of years but maintain the target but this
will affect impact. Although the targets are not
negotiable, they cannot be reached…. It’s a risk.
Officer 3: It’s even worse that we did not even achieve
50 %… The DP1 target was 30 000 but we met only
9 000.
Nonetheless, partners appreciated their efforts in
working on the mission together. They appreciated that
the pressure was really from beyond themselves. Lead
officer 5 commented:
My comrades at MH… we are all really doing the best
we possibly can but we are being pressurized from
above by our superiors.
The target still had to be reached according to WHO
requirements and external donors’ expectations. The
pressure of expectations fuelled the tension regardless of
the partners understanding of the target being unrealistic.
There were several complaints from the development
partners that MH was not taking the lead in implementa-
tion speed as the owner of the program. The integration
strategy was blamed to be slow. One officer from DP1
queried:
….In the integrated sites where there are no
development partners, the performance is down.
This was also revealed in the MH statistical report
during presentations at the meeting. The integrated sites
had attained just over 4700 men between 2011 and 2012
while the MOVE sites reached over 37,000 men in the
same period. Hence 100,000 men were not reached.
Whereas partners blamed this on MH for not putting in
more financial resources the officers at implementation
level had a different view that there were other indivi-
dualised and community or peer collective reasons why
men were not coming for SMC. They appealed that
these community reasons should be considered.
The mission threatened
In 2012, the development partners were already express-
ing possibilities of withdrawing from the program
because of low target achievement. Although MH
claimed ownership; it felt like a weakling when partners
mentioned possibilities of withdrawing their services.
Lead officer 1 expressed:
You can’t wean a baby overnight. You can’t do it just
like that. It should be a process.
Lead officer 4 then promised:
We are not weaning the baby; we are not weaning
Government now. So do not worry.
Lead officer 4 added later in interview round 2:
We certainly know one of our competitive advantages
is money, and that’s great but you can throw money
out to a problem and it does not solve a problem,
which we are learning and that is why we are opting
to stop if we are not successful.
The mission unaccomplished - Partners compelled to pull
out (Year 2014)
The DPs ultimately ceased their services, DP2 withdrew
slowly from 2013 till February 2014 and DP1 later in
2014.
The Government seemed frustrated when development
partners ceased activities. At the same time it empathised
and expressed appreciation of why they pulled away. Lead
officer 1 explained in round 3 interview in 2014:
Yeah I mean we are required to account for every
dollar used. They would calculate a certain number of
circumcisions to dollars….so the development partners
have to account for this….. We reached only about
39 % of the set target in 2012……. It is not their choice
to be pulling out. They have pressure from the
donors… the donor pulled away… They feel their
funds are not used efficiently.
The departure of the DPs set back the performance of
the program to the time it started, without the MOVE
project. Additionally this called for more expenses from
MH to cover the gaps created by MOVE. The same
officer explained:
Since DP1 pulled out men are coming to the facilities
for circumcision but there is not enough staff there to
circumcise them. So we are back to square one. We are
experiencing the very slow numbers we were
experiencing when we started… Government
Development partners pulled out from dedicated
clinics. Now it is expensive for Government.
The mission revisited -MH revisits the SMC strategy
The MH seemed ready to face the reality of true con-
sultation with communities alone. The officer explained:
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We are now back to the basics to tell the truth. We
have lost the support of partners as a country. But we
are not going to sit back and say VMMC is not
possible in Botswana. We are not giving up…We are
thinking of addressing these basic issues. Like this year
we really want each district to ensure that we are
involving the local authorities…
The officer confessed that they missed important
community consultation from the beginning:
We really missed it. We missed the behavioural
issues… and the cultural issues. We should be one in
this issue with the tribal leaders such that when I
leave here and go to Ramotswa, the chief should not
see me as Ministry of Health, but as one with his
community, to help the community…..they should be
saying we are in this together…
Although it was not carried out, the development part-
ners had also vocalised the need for true consultation
with communities before they pulled away: One of the
officers from the 3-day meeting had earlier expressed:
We need some kind of synergy between what the SMC
does and the traditional practices out there.
Lead officer 1 mentioned deploying youth as one of
the issues to be revisited:
..when you talk about demand creation, we have
learnt lessons from MOVE. We now know that we
cannot use young people to talk to older men. It
doesn’t work.
Other issues raised during discussions on why the
target was not reached concern men’s fear of pain, peer
influences, and the need for women involvement.
Output
Additive results
Additive results are things that could have still happened
without the partnership. In the findings MH revealed
that circumcision had always been part of the services of
the Botswana health system, just not offered at a massive
scale as the partnership pushed.
Synergy
Synergy refers to the positive impact or difference made
through the partnership that could have otherwise not
been achieved. The partnership created a platform for
availability of professional scientific skills that resulted in
more trained local staff on surgery and program imple-
mentation. At resource level, there were added permanent
structures within the health system DP1 constructed two
main clinics that could have otherwise not been. The table
below reflects that through integration approach alone
government would not reach the numbers that MOVE
pushed for. The synergy produced can serve as a
motivation to reinvest more resources on the program.
The government is motivated to rethink strategy even
though the partners had pulled away. As quoted above,
the government would like to consider involving the
community more (Table 3).
The target was to circumcise 100 thousand HIV
negative men from 2012 till 2016. Figures confirmed
with WHO [50] Progress Brief: Voluntary Medical Male
Circumcision for HIV Prevention in 14 priority coun-
tries in East and Southern Africa.
Antagony
Antagony occurs when the partnership is viewed as a
waste of time and resources; it is the outcome of part-
nership dysfunction where costs are more than benefits.
When external donors felt they were spending more
money but not achieving target they pulled away the
DPs from the program without completing the mission.
Discussion
Input
The BMCF provides a framework for systematically
examining the operationalisation of the partnership for
SMC. The mission was to circumcise 80 % of HIV
negative men in a 5 year period for HIV prevention.
Corbin et al. ([33]: p.52) describe the mission as an
“agreed-upon approach … to address a specific problem.”
The partners were all working towards accomplishing the
target of circumcising 80 % of HIV negative men by 2016.
The first approach, integration, was a locally developed
idea that they worked on together from the beginning; but
the MOVE approach was externally formulated by PEP-
FAR as a complete package to implement with little or no
flexibility. Concerning inputs MH contributed finance,
health structures and medical equipment, and availed its
medical staff for implementation. Both the development
partners contributed human resources for capacity
Table 3 Showing figures achieved through partnership
Year Numbers reached
2007–2009 planning period
2009 5424 with integration only
2010 5773 with integration only
2011 14,661 with integration and MOVE
2012 38,005 with integration and MOVE
2013 46,793 with integration and MOVE
2014 30,033 with integration and MOVE
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building and implementation of the program. The bulk of
financial resources were reported to come from the DPs.
Several authors on partnerships caution that resources
offered by the North to the South deserve appreciation
since they help bring change to some extent, regardless of
being an instrument of control [4, 13, 24, 51].
The target which defined the mission caused chal-
lenges that ran through all components of partnership
functioning, and caused failure to achieve the same. The
target was not locally defined to include local realities,
but was calculated using mathematical models and
recommended by WHO. Waage et al. [35] recommend
that it is important to ensure that targets that are set
internationally are easy to translate nationally. All the
three partners queried the target of circumcising 100
000 men per year. The expectation that the recipient
would act in a certain predictable way was the greatest
pit-fall of the mission [17]. Expected reciprocal response
from communities, in the form of massive numbers cir-
cumcising did not materialise for different local reasons
(see [52]). This is similar to what occurred with the
millennium development goals that believe in creating
targets to motivate but actually undermine the mission
[35]. Respondents to Sjostedt’s study on aid effectiveness
assessing NGOs using three different aid modalities in
Tanzania, Cambodia and Zanzibar “..voiced concerns
about whether or not the strict focus on results—and
especially on reporting them—in fact channeled aid into
easily measurable activities at the expense of more
complex and long-term processes with potentially
higher, but less easily measured, impacts.” ([36], p153). It
is acknowledged that partners made strategic efforts to
push the target but the same efforts also created conflict.
For example, deployment of DPs’ staff to Government
health centers and later separating them to form MOVE
teams was appreciated as creating focus, yet also blamed
for creating Government’s dependency on DPs. DHMTs’
priorities were ill patients. Waage et al. [35] observe that
the focus on target rather than broader goals has
contributed to countries distancing themselves from a
global agenda that is seen as irrelevant in their particular
development situation.
Throughput
The functioning of the partnership is revealed through
communication, input interaction, leadership, and partner
roles. Each of the four elements shaping the collaborative
context worked well at some stage in the partnership, but
turned to be a source of contention through time.
Although there were tensions between the in-country
partners, they were working together in strategising to
address some challenges of the partnership and imple-
mentation. Pressure from external donors undermined
such efforts. Firstly, there was cooperation and agreement
in the planning process where common implementation
and reporting strategy were developed. However this did
not live up to planned ideals at implementation level as
DPs used different training tools, report tools and
reported inconsistently to MH. Communication became a
problem. Although in their studies, Weiss and colleagues
[44] did not find that partner involvement challenges had
any effect on synergy, they argue that less partner involve-
ment in agreed strategies and goals, as well as lack of
cooperation reduces synergy [44].
Secondly, the leadership of the program was clearly
seen as MH’s. MH claimed and was referred to as a
chair, coordinator and owner. Complementary to the
leadership, DPs viewed themselves as ‘catalysts’ to help
the government speed up the SMC scale up and as
partners adding to resources necessary for successful
implementation. However, the MH leadership role was
questioned and contested through time. When MOVE
superseded the integration approach, who owned and
led the project became confused. WHO makes it clear
that ownership of programs should be through participa-
tion of national leadership [5, 53]. The highest leadership
of the country was criticized for not supporting the pro-
gram as its “face” [24]. Members of Parliament reported
being busy and having no capacity to participate. How-
ever, it is the political leadership that signed the MDGs
and are rightfully challenged to show high participation
[53]. Kenworthy [54] argues that recipient countries turn
to endorse external new and exciting programs that they
may not have the capacity to ‘own’ and sustain. It is very
obvious that human resources for health in Botswana,
although a factor beyond this partnership, need address-
ing. Human health resources is critical in combating all
health challenges therefore national policies as well as
global governance should consider that developing coun-
tries need additional heath workers to manage workload,
since the workforce is already overloaded with multiple
tasks [55, 56].
He adds that the fancy leadership/ownership phrases
given the recipient countries are just a facade to cover
the continuous exercise of power by the international fi-
nancial agencies. Additionally DPs questioned the place-
ment of MH national coordinators, suggesting change.
They also queried DHMTs’ participation and leadership,
questioning their priorities. Power and control of how
things should work is in the nature of Northern partners
[24]. In fact, DP1 confirmed that they brought in train-
ing on how the partnership and coordination should
work. This goes with Abrahamsen’s observation that
“..western countries and the institution of global govern-
ance still hold considerable sway over African states due
primarily to their aid dependency and general economic
weakness” [10]. Even though recipient countries are
placed at the driver’s seat for driving the MDGs, critics
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observe that the recommended health programs often
clash with in-country priorities [35].
Thirdly, there seemed to be clear roles and structure
of the partnership. However the same also proved to be
problematic. Ownership is defined by different leader-
ship roles. Although all partners identified MH as owner,
in practice ownership was measured according to the
level of financial contribution. The DPs’ high level of
funding mystified ownership and caused tension. Corbin
et al. [33] contend that symbolic funding, (e.g MH’s
contribution in terms of health structures and own
employed staff ) should have been seen as in-kind finan-
cial contribution [33]. However the same authors find
this as a difficult issue because converting the cost of
local in-kind contribution to dollars can be problematic.
International donors (who were not ‘leading’ the part-
nership) controlled use of ‘donated’ financial resources.
Whereas there seemed to be little transparency on the
DPs’ use of funds, MH as ‘owner’ had to account for all
program funds to OECD. MH also had to account for
the imbalance in the usage of surgical equipment. The
structure of the partnership seemed lopsided. In fact, as
in most North-South partnerships, accountability seems
to always be one-sided [13, 35]. This could also be ex-
plained by an observation of Corbin and Mittelmark [3]
that partners may choose the route of blurry account-
ability if they experience that working mutually absorbs
substantial resources and that consensus building proce-
dures take a long time.
Output and feed back to mission
Our findings show all levels of output in the BMFC:
additive results through a revelation that MC was not a
new thing that was brought in by the partnership, but
that it has always been one of the health services given
to the public. The partnership attained synergistic out-
come as well, that is 2 + 2 = 5, where more results
achieved through the partnership at integration and
MOVE phases, which could have never been without the
partnership. Types of synergy like shared knowledge be-
tween partners, shared resources and problem solving
were evident in the partnership [43]. There was contin-
ued feedback into the mission throughout the through-
put process as synergistic and antagonistic results were
realised. Partners met annually to reflect on results and
strategise on solutions. When the integration approach
did not achieve sufficient output, in 2011 the partners
agreed to strengthen the program by bringing in the
MOVE approach. Although greater output was achieved
through MOVE the contention on not meeting the tar-
get in 2012 resulted in antagony (DPs cutting down the
financial and partners resources in 2013 and finally with-
drawing in 2014). It is observed that external donors
(PEPFAR and Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) had
greater influence on the functioning of the in-country
partnership as vertical interaction (feedback) with them
was demanded. This is a confirmation of the power of
those holding the purse, the North, being greater than
those with a begging bowl, the South [10]. The result
was discord between in-country partners, with accusa-
tions on wasting time and money. Pressure from the
Northern donors caused the DPs to withdraw from the
partnership and the cost was a drastic decline in numbers
of men coming for MC. The global context in which HIV/
AIDS programs operate tends to be prescriptive, under-
mining locally initiated strategies and creating dependency
[57]. Although the global health apparatus has an import-
ant context for developing interventions and mobilising
resources for support, it cannot be successful without local
participation. This implies that neither global nor national
policies for health programs should be treated as absolute,
but there has to be a genuine integration of indigenous
and international strategies that if applied, could salvage
massive resources that continue being lost as a result of
vertical control [57, 58]. Also international organisations,
like the DPs in this case, need to be given agency such that
they play an advisory role to their international donors
informing them of realities on the ground that cannot be
overlooked.
According to the BMFC model antagony feeds in and
out the collaborative process of the partnership and can
be used positively to improve progress. Corbin et al. [33]
argue that antagony can create an opportunity for
partners to reflect on what went wrong and what could
have been done differently. In this case, although left
alone, MH was now reconsidering its whole approach,
learning from the partnership mistakes and preparing to
revisit and improve its integration approach to implemen-
tation. In fact, there has been debates over time on
whether vertical programmes that attend to one problem
at a time are effective or whether all health problems
should be assimilated into the lager primary health care
system, as the integration approach attempted [59]. The
challenge of cost effectiveness is still to be addressed [59].
Limitations
Whereas all partner organisations were given equal
opportunities to participate in the research, the MH was
more forthcoming in allowing several officers to be
interviewed. MH was also more available for interviews
at different phases as the partnership evolved. In that
way some partners have not had a chance to give their
full views and experiences at different phases of the part-
nership. However, each organisation had given its frank
overall view of the partnership in the initial 3-day
planning meeting that the researcher attended, and in
immediate second interviews. Although it was evident that
most decisions affecting implementation and partnership
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relations had an influence of the external donors’
pressures the first author was not able to access them for
direct interviews. Systematic reflexivity was applied
throughout the data collection and analysis stages. The
results cannot be generalised to all countries, however
they give important insightful lessons on partnership
functioning for aspects that can be embraced and those
that can be avoided. This paper does not look at factors
that have led to particular outcomes, especially antagony
or the nature of antagony, and this will be followed.
Conclusion
This paper used a systems model to explore the function-
ing of the SMC partnership in Botswana. It has assessed
different achievements and challenges that the partnership
was facing. We conclude that external influences that
come from the unseen international donors influenced the
working of the in-country partnership, unfortunately
crippling it from resolving implementation challenges as
experienced within the context of partnership functioning.
The experience of SMC partnership in Botswana showed
that key influences on the success or failure of partner-
ships are financial resources, “ownership” and the target.
The very mechanisms used for accountability by the Paris
Declaration are sabotaged by the same global context
where the exercise of power and financial leverage by
international donors reign. A combination of inputs by
partners brought progress towards achieving set program
goals. However, prioritising externally formulated
programs and lack of appreciation for local symbolic
funding undermined local efforts and gave blurriness in
leadership and ownership of the program. Pressure to
meet the expectations of the international donors caused
tension and challenges between the in-country partners
and caused the DPs to retreat, and not pursue the mission
further. Externally formulated goals and targets, as well as
subsequent expectations from external donors placed the
functioning and contextual interaction of the partnership
at risk. Tensions in achieving the target, financial and in-
kind resources and ownership queries resulted in DPs
withdrawing before accomplishing the mission. All in all
the key contribution of the study to the BMFC theory is
that the functioning of the visible in-country partnership
is significantly influenced by the less visible global context
such as the target setters and donors.
Endnotes
1“Parental states” is not proper English, but is a direct
translation from Setswana language phrase used by
Government officers to show that the Government is the
leader/the host /he owner/the one responsible for the
program and other partners fall under their authority.
That is why one of the officers referred to Government
as a “parent” in one of the quotations below.
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